Rom 9:17-19 | Abbott | STEP | This is, perhaps, the most of the numerous passages, occurring in the Scriptures, in which it is asserted that the control of Almighty God is absolute and entire over all the moral conduct of his creatures, whether evil or good—a control so absolute and entire, that if, in the course of his administration, he deems it expedient to exhibit to the universe a spectacle of sin and its consequences, he can do so,—while yet the moral responsibility and ill desert of the sin rests solely with the being who commits it. Such a doctrine awakens very different feelings in different minds. Some repose in quiet and submissive confidence under the absolute and boundless moral sovereignty with which it invests Jehovah. Others find it utterly irreconcilable with what they regard as plain principles of justice, and the very statement of it seems to awaken in their minds feelings of abhorrence and detestation. Many classes of excellent Christians endeavor to soften this doctrine by allowing to the power of Jehovah an efficient control over all the right and holy desires and acts of his creatures, while they limit, and qualify in various ways, his agency in respect to those that are wrong; for the minds of mankind at large are found to acquiesce much more readily in assigning to God a direct agency in the production of holiness, than in that of sin. It is, however, somewhat doubtful whether the real difficulty is much alleviated, in a philosophical point of view, by this management; for we cannot easily conceive how one kind of moral conduct or character can be determined by a superior power, consistently with the freedom of the agent, rather than another; that is to say, if God can produce penitence in David's heart, which shall yet be wholly David's penitence, and for which David only shall be morally responsible, it is difficult to show any reason why the same kind of moral power, operating reversely, may not produce obduracy in Pharaoh's heart, which shall be wholly Pharaoh's obduracy, and for which Pharaoh alone is morally accountable. There is a great difference between the two cases, in respect to the readiness with which the mind is willing to admit such a power; but it would probably not be easy to establish between them any philosophical distinction. The difficulty seems insurmountable to human powers in either case. But, then, we must consider that, whatever difficulties may attend this subject, they seem to be involved in the very idea of a divinity really supreme. And, even if we relinquish the idea of a divinity, and substitute, as in that case we must, the control of steadily-acting laws, mental and corporeal, over the phenomena of matter and mind,—the doctrine of philosophical necessity takes the place of that of the personal sovereignty of Jehovah, and it is, to say the least, quite as intractable in respect to its consistency with human freedom. The difficulties, then, would seem, cannot, on any hypothesis, be either solved or avoided. The result is, that the only way in which the mind can be really at peace on this subject is humbly to acquiesce in our incapacity to fathom this gulf, in theory, and then practically to yield our full and cordial assent, on the one hand, to the dictates of conscience, which testify that we are entirely unrestrained in our moral conduct, and so accountable for it,—and, on the other, to the word of God, asserting that Jehovah is supreme, and that his providence includes and controls all that takes place under his reign.

Romans 9:17-19

This is, perhaps, the most of the numerous passages, occurring in the Scriptures, in which it is asserted that the control of Almighty God is absolute and entire over all the moral conduct of his creatures, whether evil or good—a control so absolute and entire, that if, in the course of his administration, he deems it expedient to exhibit to the universe a spectacle of sin and its consequences, he can do so,—while yet the moral responsibility and ill desert of the sin rests solely with the being who commits it. Such a doctrine awakens very different feelings in different minds. Some repose in quiet and submissive confidence under the absolute and boundless moral sovereignty with which it invests Jehovah. Others find it utterly irreconcilable with what they regard as plain principles of justice, and the very statement of it seems to awaken in their minds feelings of abhorrence and detestation. Many classes of excellent Christians endeavor to soften this doctrine by allowing to the power of Jehovah an efficient control over all the right and holy desires and acts of his creatures, while they limit, and qualify in various ways, his agency in respect to those that are wrong; for the minds of mankind at large are found to acquiesce much more readily in assigning to God a direct agency in the production of holiness, than in that of sin. It is, however, somewhat doubtful whether the real difficulty is much alleviated, in a philosophical point of view, by this management; for we cannot easily conceive how one kind of moral conduct or character can be determined by a superior power, consistently with the freedom of the agent, rather than another; that is to say, if God can produce penitence in David's heart, which shall yet be wholly David's penitence, and for which David only shall be morally responsible, it is difficult to show any reason why the same kind of moral power, operating reversely, may not produce obduracy in Pharaoh's heart, which shall be wholly Pharaoh's obduracy, and for which Pharaoh alone is morally accountable. There is a great difference between the two cases, in respect to the readiness with which the mind is willing to admit such a power; but it would probably not be easy to establish between them any philosophical distinction. The difficulty seems insurmountable to human powers in either case. But, then, we must consider that, whatever difficulties may attend this subject, they seem to be involved in the very idea of a divinity really supreme. And, even if we relinquish the idea of a divinity, and substitute, as in that case we must, the control of steadily-acting laws, mental and corporeal, over the phenomena of matter and mind,—the doctrine of philosophical necessity takes the place of that of the personal sovereignty of Jehovah, and it is, to say the least, quite as intractable in respect to its consistency with human freedom. The difficulties, then, would seem, cannot, on any hypothesis, be either solved or avoided. The result is, that the only way in which the mind can be really at peace on this subject is humbly to acquiesce in our incapacity to fathom this gulf, in theory, and then practically to yield our full and cordial assent, on the one hand, to the dictates of conscience, which testify that we are entirely unrestrained in our moral conduct, and so accountable for it,—and, on the other, to the word of God, asserting that Jehovah is supreme, and that his providence includes and controls all that takes place under his reign.