‏ Ecclesiastes 2:11-13

Ecc 2:11

But was this חלק a יתרון - was this gain that fell to him a true, satisfying, pure gain? With the words uphanithi ani he proposes this question, and answers it. פּנה (to turn to) is elsewhere followed by expressions of motion to an end; here, as at Job 6:28, by בּ, by virtue of a constructio praegnans: I turned myself, fixing my attention on all my works which my hands accomplished. La'asoth is, as at Gen 2:3 (vid., l.c.), equivalent to perficiendo, carrying out, viz., such works of art and of all his labour. The exclamation “behold” introduces the summa summarum. Regardingיתרון, vid., Ecc 1:3. Also this way of finding out that which was truly good showed itself to be false. Of all this enjoyment, there remained nothing but the feeling of emptiness. What he strove after appeared to him as the wind; the satisfaction he sought to obtain at such an expense was nothing else than a momentary delusion. And since in this search after the true happiness of life he was in a position more favourable for such a purpose than almost any other man, he is constrained to draw the conclusion that there is no יתרון, i.e., no real enduring and true happiness, from all labour under the sun.
Ecc 2:12 “And I turned myself to examine wisdom, and madness, and folly: for what is the man who could come after the king, him whom they have made so long ago!” Mendelssohn’s translation, Ecc 2:12: “I abandoned my design of seeking to connect wisdom with folly and madness,” is impossible, because for such a rendering we should have had at least מלּראות instead of לראות. Hitzig, otherwise followed by Stuart: “I turned myself to examine me wisdom, and, lo, it was madness as well as folly.” This rendering is impossible also, for in such a case הנּהו ought to have stood as the result, after חכמה. The pasage, Zec 14:6, cited by Hitz., does not prove the possibility of such a brachyology, for there we read not veqaroth veqeppayon, but eqaroth iqeppaūn (the splendid ones, i.e., the stars, will draw themselves together, i.e., will become dark bodies). The two vavs are not correlative, which is without example in the usage of this book, but copulative: he wishes to contemplate (Zöckler and others) wisdom on the one side, and madness and folly on the other, in their relation to each other, viz., in their relative worth. Hitzig’s ingenuity goes yet further astray in Ecc 2:12: “For what will the man do who comes after the king? (He shall do) what was long ago his (own) doing, i.e., inheriting from the king the throne, he will not also inherit his wisdom.” Instead of āsūhū, he reads ǎsōhū, after Exo 18:18; but the more modern author, whose work we have here before us, would, instead of this anomalous form, use the regular form עשׂותו; but, besides, the expression ēth asher-kevar 'asotho, “(he will do) what long ago was his doing,” is not Heb.; the words ought to have been keasotho kevar khen i'sah, or at least 'asāhū. If we compare Ecc 2:12 with 18 b, the man who comes after the king appears certainly to be his successor.
The lxx and Symm. by hammělêk think of melak, counsel, βουλή, instead of melek, king; and as Jerome, so also Bardach understands by the king the rex factor, i.e., God the Creator.

But by this supposition it is impossible to give just effect to the relation (assigning a reason or motive) of Ecc 2:12 to 12 a expressed by כּי. When I considered, Knobel regards Koheleth as saying, that a fool would be heir to me a wise man, it appeared strange to me, and I was led to compare wisdom and folly to see whether or not the wise man has a superiority to the fool, or whether his labour and his fate are vanity, like those of the fool. This is in point of style absurd, but it is much more absurd logically. And who then gave the interpreter the right to stamp as a fool the man who comes after the king? In the answer: “That which has long ago been done,” must lie its justification; for this that was done long ago naturally consists, as Zöckler remarks, in foolish and perverse undertakings, certainly in the destruction of that which was done by the wise predecessor, in the lavish squandering of the treasures and goods collected by him. More briefly, but in the same sense, Burger: Nihil quod a solita hominum agendi ratione recedit. But in Ecc 2:19, Koheleth places it as a question whether his successor will be a wise man or a fool, while here he would presuppose that “naturally,” or as a matter of course, he will be a fool. In the matter of style, we have nothing to object to the translation on which Zöckler, with Rabm., Rosenm., Knobel, Hengst., and others, proceeds; the supplying of the verb יעשׂה to meh hāādām = what can the man do? is possible (cf. Mal 2:15), and the neut. interpret. of the suffix of עשׂוּהוּ is, after Ecc 7:13; Amo 1:3; Job 31:11, admissible; but the reference to a successor is not connected with the course of the thoughts, even although one attaches to the plain words a meaning which is foreign to them. The words עשׂוּהוּ...את are accordingly not the answer to the question proposed, but a component part of the question itself. Thus Ewald, and with him Elster, Heiligst., construes: “How will the man be who will follow the king, compared with him whom they made (a king) long ago, i.e., with his predecessor?” But את, in this pregnant sense, “compared with,” is without example, at least in the Book of Koheleth, which generally does not use it as a prep.; and, besides, this rendering, by introducing the successor on the throne, offends against the logic of the relation of Ecc 2:12 to Ecc 2:12.

The motive of Koheleth’s purpose, to weigh wisdom and folly against each other as to their worth, consists in this, that a king, especially such an one as Solomon was, has in the means at his disposal and in the extent of his observation so much more than everyother, that no one who comes after him will reach a different experience. This motive would be satisfactorily expressed on the supposition that the answer begins with את, if one should read עשׂהוּ for עשׂוּהוּ: he will be able to do (accomplish) nothing but what he (the king) has long ago done, i.e., he will only repeat, only be able to confirm, the king’s report. But if we take the text as it here stands, the meaning is the same; and, besides, we get rid of the harsh ellipsis měh hāādām for měh yǎǎsěh hāādām. We translate: for what is the man who might come after the king, him whom they have made so long ago! The king whom they made so long ago is Solomon, who has a richer experience, a more comprehensive knowledge, the longer the time (viz., from the present time backwards) since he occupied the throne. Regarding the expression eth asher = quem, instead of the asher simply, vid., Köhler under Zec 12:10. עשׂוּהוּ, with the most general subj., is not different from נעשׂה, which, particularly in the Book of Daniel (e.g., Dan 4:28.), has frequently an active construction, with the subject unnamed, instead of the passive (Gesen. §137, margin). The author of the Book of Koheleth, alienated from the theocratic side of the kingdom of Israel, makes use of it perhaps not unintentionally; besides, Solomon’s elevation to the throne was, according to 1 Kings 1, brought about very much by human agency; and one may, if he will, think of the people in the word 'asuhu also, according to 1Ki 1:39, who at last decided the matter. Meh before the letters hheth and ayin commonly occurs: according to the Masora, twenty-four times; before other initial letters than these, eight times, and three of these in the Book of Koheleth before the letter he, Ecc 2:12, Ecc 2:22; Ecc 7:10. The words are more an exclamation than a question; the exclamation means: What kind of a man is that who could come after the king! cf. “What wickedness is this!” etc., Jdg 20:12; Jos 22:16; Exo 18:14; 1Ki 9:13, i.e., as standing behind with reference to me-the same figure of extenuatio, as mah adam, Psa 144:3; cf. Ecc 8:5.

There now follows an account of what, on the one side, happened to him thus placed on a lofty watch-tower, such as no other occupied.
Ecc 2:13-15 “And I saw that wisdom has the advantage over folly, as light has the advantage over darkness. The wise man has eyes in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness.” In the sacred Scriptures, “light” is generally the symbol of grace, Psa 43:3, but also the contrast of an intellectually and morally darkened state, Isa 51:4. To know a thing is equivalent to having light on it, and seeing it in its true light (Psa 36:10); wisdom is thus compared to light; folly is once, Job 38:19, directly called “darkness.” Thus wisdom stands so much higher than folly, as light stands above darkness.יתרון, which hitherto denoted actual result, enduring gain, signifies here preference; along with כּיתרון
Thus written, according to J and other authorities.
there is also found the form כּיתרון
Thus Ven. 1515, 1521; vid., Comm. under Gen 27:28-29; Psa 45:10.
(vid., Pro 30:17). The fool walks in darkness: he is blind although he has eyes (Isa 43:8), and thus has as good as none, - he wants the spiritual eye of understanding (Job 10:3); the wise man, on the other hand, his eyes are in his head, or, as we also say: he has eyes in his head, - eyes truly seeing, looking at and examining persons and things. That is the one side of the relation of wisdom to folly as put to the test.

The other side of the relation is the sameness of the result in which the elevation of wisdom above folly terminates. “And I myself perceived that one experience happeneth to them all. And I said in my heart, As it will happen to the fool, it will happen also to me; and why have I then been specially wise? Thus I spake then in my heart, that this also is vain.” Zöckler gives to גּם an adversative sense; but this gam (= ὃμως, similiter) stands always at the beginning of the clause, Ewald, §354a. Gam-ani corresponds to the Lat. ego idem, which gives two predicates to one subject; while et ipse predicates the same of the one of two subjects as it does of the other (Zumpt, §697). The second gam-ani serves for the giving of prominence to the object, and here precedes, after the manner of a substantival clause (cf. Isa 45:12; Eze 33:17; 2Ch 28:10), as at Gen 24:27; cf. Gesen. §121. 3. Miqrěh (from קרה, to happen, to befall) is quiquid alicui accidit (in the later philosoph. terminol. accidens; Venet. συμβεβεεκός); but here, as the connection shows, that which finally puts an end to life, the final event of death. By the word יד the author expresses what he had observed on reflection; by בּל...אם, what he said inwardly to himself regarding it; and by דּבּ דל, what sentence he passed thereon with himself. Lammah asks for the design, as maddu'a for the reason. אז is either understood temporally: then when it is finally not better with me than with the fool (Hitz. from the standpoint of the dying hour), or logically: if yet one and the same event happeneth to the wise man and to the fool (Eslt.); in the consciousness of the author both are taken together.The זה of the conclusion refers, not, as at Ecc 1:17, to the endeavouring after and the possession of wisdom, but to this final result making no difference between wise men and fools. This fate, happening to all alike, is הבל, a vanity rendering all vain, a nullity levelling down all to nothing, something full of contradictions, irrational. Paul also (Rom 8:20) speaks of this destruction, which at last comes upon all, as a ματαιότης.

The author now assigns the reason for this discouraging result.
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