Ecc 3:17-18 | KD | STEP | “I said in mine heart: God shall judge the righteous as well as the wicked: for there is there a time for every purpose and for every work.” Since “the righteous” stands first, the word ישׁפּט has here the double sense of judging [richtens = setting upright] = acting uprightly, justly by one, as in the shofteni of ; , etc., and of judging = inflicting punishment. To the righteous, as well as to the wicked, God will administer that which of right belongs to them. But this does not immediately happen, and has to be waited for a long time, for there is a definite time for every undertaking ( ), and for (על, in the more modern form of the language, interchanges promiscue with אל ht and ל, e.g. , ; ; Ewald, §217 i ) every work there is a “time.” This שׁם, defended by all the old interpreters, cannot have a temporal sense: tunc = in die judicii (Jerome, Targ.), cf. ; 36:13, for “a time of judgment there is for all one day” is not intended, since certainly the שׁם (day of judgment) is this time itself, and not the time of this time. Ewald renders שׁם as pointing to the past, for he thus construes: the righteous and the unrighteous God will judge (for there is a time for everything), and judge ( vav thus explicat., “and that too,” “and indeed”) every act there, i.e. , everything done before. But this שׁם is not only heavy, but also ambiguous and purposeless; and besides, by this parenthesizing of the words וגו עת כּי for there is a time for everything, the principal thought, that with God everything, even His act of judgment, has its time, is robbed of its independence and of the place in the principal clause appropriate to it. But if שׁם is understood adverbially, it certainly has a local meaning connected with it: there, viz., with God, apud Deum ; true, for this use of the word affords the only example, and it stands there in the midst of a very solemn and earnest address. Therefore it lies near to read, with Houbig., Döderl., Palm., and Hitz., שׁם, “a definite time ... has He (God) ordained;” שׂום (שׂים) is the usual word for the ordinances of God in the natural world and in human history ( ; ; Num 24:23; , etc.), and, as in the Assyr. simtuv, so the Heb. שׂימה (שׂוּמה), , signifies lot or fate, decree. With this reading, Elster takes exception to the position of the words; but at Jdg 6:19 also the object goes before שׂם, and “unto every purpose and for every work” is certainly the complement of the object-conception, so that the position of the words is in reality no other than at ; . Quite untenable is Herzfeld’s supposition (Fürst, Vaih.), that שׁם has here the Talm. signification: aestimat, taxat, for (1) this שׁוּם = Arab. sham, has not על, but the accus. after it; (2) the thought referring to the tie on which rests is thereby interrupted. Whether we read שׂם, or take שׁם in the sense of עמּו ( ; , etc.), the thought is the same, and equally congruous: God will judge the innocent and the guilty; it shall be done some time, although not so soon as one might wish it, and think necessary, for God has for every undertaking and for every work its fixed time, also its judicial decision ( vid ., at ); He permits wickedness, lets it develope itself, waits long before He interposes ( vid ., under Isa 18:4.). Reflecting on God’s delay to a time hidden from men, and known only to Himself, Koheleth explains the matter to himself in the following verse: -

‏ Ecclesiastes 3:17-18

Ecc 3:17 “I said in mine heart: God shall judge the righteous as well as the wicked: for there is there a time for every purpose and for every work.” Since “the righteous” stands first, the word ישׁפּט has here the double sense of judging [richtens = setting upright] = acting uprightly, justly by one, as in the shofteni of Psa 7:9; Psa 26:1, etc., and of judging = inflicting punishment. To the righteous, as well as to the wicked, ^{▼▼The lxx (in Aquila’s manner): σὺν τὸν δίκαιον καὶ σὺν τὸν ἀσεβῆ - according to the Talm. hermeneut. rule, that where the obj. is designated by את, with that which is expressly named, something else is associated, and is to be thought of along with it.}

God will administer that which of right belongs to them. But this does not immediately happen, and has to be waited for a long time, for there is a definite time for every undertaking (Ecc 3:1), and for (על, in the more modern form of the language, interchanges promiscue with אל ht and ל, e.g., Jer 19:15; Eze 22:3; Ewald, §217 i) every work there is a “time.” This שׁם, defended by all the old interpreters, cannot have a temporal sense: tunc = in die judicii (Jerome, Targ.), cf. Psa 14:5; 36:13, for “a time of judgment there is for all one day” is not intended, since certainly the שׁם (day of judgment) is this time itself, and not the time of this time. Ewald renders שׁם as pointing to the past, for he thus construes: the righteous and the unrighteous God will judge (for there is a time for everything), and judge (vav thus explicat., “and that too,” “and indeed”) every act there, i.e., everything done before. But this שׁם is not only heavy, but also ambiguous and purposeless; and besides, by this parenthesizing of the words וגו עת כּי for there is a time for everything, the principal thought, that with God everything, even His act of judgment, has its time, is robbed of its independence and of the place in the principal clause appropriate to it. But if שׁם is understood adverbially, it certainly has a local meaning connected with it: there, viz., with God, apud Deum; true, for this use of the word Gen 49:24 affords the only example, and it stands there in the midst of a very solemn and earnest address. Therefore it lies near to read, with Houbig., Döderl., Palm., and Hitz., שׁם, “a definite time ... has He (God) ordained;” שׂום (שׂים) is the usual word for the ordinances of God in the natural world and in human history (Pro 8:29; Exo 21:13; Num 24:23; Hab 1:12, etc.), and, as in the Assyr. simtuv, so the Heb. שׂימה (שׂוּמה), 2Sa 13:32, signifies lot or fate, decree. ^{▼▼Vid., Schrader’s Keilsch. u. A. T. p. 105, simtu ubilsu, i.e., fate snatched him away (Heb. simah hovilathhu), cf. Fried. Delitzsch’s Assyr. Stud. p. 66f.}

With this reading, Elster takes exception to the position of the words; but at Jdg 6:19 also the object goes before שׂם, and “unto every purpose and for every work” is certainly the complement of the object-conception, so that the position of the words is in reality no other than at Ecc 10:20; Dan 2:17. Quite untenable is Herzfeld’s supposition (Fürst, Vaih.), that שׁם has here the Talm. signification: aestimat, taxat, for (1) this שׁוּם = Arab. sham, has not על, but the accus. after it; (2) the thought referring to the tie on which Ecc 3:18 rests is thereby interrupted. Whether we read שׂם, or take שׁם in the sense of עמּו (Job 25:2; Job 23:14, etc.), the thought is the same, and equally congruous: God will judge the innocent and the guilty; it shall be done some time, although not so soon as one might wish it, and think necessary, for God has for every undertaking and for every work its fixed time, also its judicial decision (vid., at Psa 74:3); He permits wickedness, lets it develope itself, waits long before He interposes (vid., under Isa 18:4.).

Reflecting on God’s delay to a time hidden from men, and known only to Himself, Koheleth explains the matter to himself in the following verse: - Ecc 3:18 “Thus I said then in mine heart: (it happeneth) for the sake of the children of men that God might sift them, and that they might see that they are like the cattle, they in themselves.” Regarding על־דּב for the sake of = on account of as at Ecc 8:2, vid., under Psa 110:4, where it signifies after (κατά) the state of the matter. The infin. לבּ is not derived from בּוּר. - לּבוּר, Ecc 9:1, is only the metaplastic form of לבר or לברר - but only from בּרר, whose infin. may take the form בּר, after the form רד, to tread down, Isa 45:1, שׁך, to bow, Jer 5:26; but nowhere else is this infin. form found connected with a suff.; קחם, Hos 11:3, would be in some measure to be compared, if it could be supposed that this = בּקחתּם, sumendo eos. The root בר proceeds, from the primary idea of cutting, on the one side to the idea of separating, winnowing, choosing out; and, on the other, to that of smoothing, polishing, purifying (vid., under Isa 49:2). Here, by the connection, the meaning of winnowing, i.e., of separating the good from the bad, is intended, with which, however, as in לברר, Dan 11:35, the meaning of making clear, making light, bringing forward into the light, easily connects itself (cf. Shabbath 138 a, 74 a), of which the meaning to winnow (cf. להבר, Jer 4:11) is only a particular form; ^{▼▼Not “to sift,” for not בּרר but רקּד, means “to sift” (properly, “to make to keep up,” “to agitate”); cf. Shebîith v. 9.} cf. Sanhedrin 7 b: “when a matter is clear, brwr, to thee (free from ambiguity) as the morning, speak it out; and if not, do not speak it.”

In the expression לב האל, the word האל is, without doubt, the subject, according to Gesen. §133. 2. 3; Hitz. regards האל as genit., which, judged according to the Arab., is correct; it is true that for li-imti-ḥânihim allahi (with genit. of the subj.), also allahu (with nominat. of the subj.) may be used; but the former expression is the more regular and more common (vid., Ewald’s Gramm. Arab. §649), but not always equally decisive with reference to the Heb. usus loq. That God delays His righteous interference till the time appointed beforehand, is for the sake of the children of men, with the intention, viz., that God may sift them, i.e., that, without breaking in upon the free development of their characters before the time, He may permit the distinction between the good and the bad to become manifest. Men, who are the obj. to לב, are the subject to לראותו to be supplied: et ut videant; it is unnecessary, with the lxx, Syr., and Jerome, to read ולראות (= וּלהר): ut ostenderet. It is a question whether המּה ^{▼▼המּה שׁהם בּהמה thus accented rightly in F. Cf. Michlol 216 a.} is the expression of the copula: sunt (sint), or whether hēmmah lahěm is a closer definition, co-ordinate with shehem behēmah. The remark of Hitzig, that lahěm throws back the action on the subject, is not clear. Does he suppose that lahem belongs to liroth? That is here impossible. If we look away from lahem, the needlessly circumstantial expression הם ... שה can still be easily understood: hemmah takes up, as an echo, behemah, and completes the comparison (compare the battology in Hos 13:2). This play upon words musically accompanying the thought remains also, when, according to the accentuation שׁה בהם ה לה, we take hemmah along with lahem, and the former as well as the latter of these two words is then better understood. The ל in להם is not that of the pure dat. (Aben Ezra: They are like beasts to themselves, i.e., in their own estimation), but that of reference, as at Gen 17:20, “as for Ishmael;” cf. Psa 3:3; 2Ki 5:7; cf. אל, 1Sa 1:27, etc. Men shall see that they are cattle (beasts), they in reference to themselves, i.e., either they in reference to themselves mutually (Luther: among themselves), or: they in reference to themselves. To interpret the reference as that of mutual relation, would, in looking back to Ecc 3:16, commend itself, for the condemnation and oppression of the innocent under the appearance of justice is an act of human brutishness. But the reason assigned in Ecc 3:19 does not accord with this reciprocal rendering of lahem. Thus lahem will be meant reflexively, but it is not on that account pleonastic (Knobel), nor does it ironically form a climax:ipsissimi = höchstselbst (Ewald, §315a); but “they in reference to themselves” is = they in and of themselves, i.e., viewed as men (viewed naturally). If one disregards the idea of God’s interfering at a future time with the discordant human history, and, in general, if one loses sight of God, the distinction between the life of man and of beast disappears.