1 Kings 20:1-25
20:1 a Whether this is Ben-hadad I or II is unclear.• thirty-two allied kings: Confederations of kings were common in the ancient Near East. Shalmaneser III recorded Ben-hadad’s name as Hadad-ezer and reported that he was part of a twelve-king coalition that opposed him in the Battle of Qarqar (853 BC).
Summary for 1Kgs 20:2-4: 20:2-4 b Ben-hadad’s first delegation of messengers brought his demand that Israel must agree to surrender both its treasures and people. Ahab capitulated, wanting peace at any cost. He would give up royal treasures and even his family rather than face bloody war with a powerful enemy.
Summary for 1Kgs 20:7-9: 20:7-9 c When Ben-hadad’s second delegation made even greater demands (see 1 Sam 11:1-2 d), Ahab recognized that Ben-hadad seemed bent on war. Ahab repeated his compliance with Ben-hadad’s first demand but rejected the second.
• my lord the king: Ahab addressed Ben-hadad in polite diplomatic terms, conceding his willingness to accept the Aramean king’s rule. Perhaps he hoped that his courteous reply would still avoid military confrontation.
Summary for 1Kgs 20:10-11: 20:10-11 e Ben-hadad’s third delegation delivered an ultimatum: Surrender or die. His caustic threat to thoroughly plunder Samaria was reinforced with a curse, an example of the psychological warfare often practiced in the ancient Near East (see 2 Kgs 18:19-35 f).
• Ahab’s third reply to Ben-hadad contained proverbial wisdom. The outcome of the conflict was not yet sealed.
20:12 g Ben-hadad and the other kings ... were drinking in their tents in anticipation of Ahab’s capitulation. Ahab’s reply constituted a challenge, and the Aramean officers prepared to attack.
Summary for 1Kgs 20:13-34: 20:13-34 h Two distinct battles ensued, one in Samaria (20:13-25 i) and one at Aphek (20:26-34 j). The writer included similar details regarding both: (1) pre-battle counsel (20:13-14 k, 23-25 l), (2) pre-battle conditions (20:15-16 m, 26-28 n), (3) victory for Israel despite the superior numbers of the enemy (20:17-21 o, 29-30 p), and (4) post-battle counsel (20:22 q, 31 r).
Summary for 1Kgs 20:13-16: 20:13-16 s Ahab’s forces attacked about noontime after receiving assurance of victory from an unknown prophet. The Jewish historian Josephus suggested that the prophet was Micaiah (cp. 22:8 t). The timing of the Israelite attack, during the heat of the day (see Josh 8:14 u), took the enemy by surprise. Ben-hadad and the ... allied kings were still drinking, demonstrating their disdain for Ahab’s military capability.
20:17 v first contingent: Ahab apparently sent this small squad to test the enemy. Surprise attacks in the ancient Near East often divided the attacking forces into assault groups designed to launch a pincer movement against the enemy (Judg 7:16 w; 1 Sam 11:11 x), to lure the opposing forces into an ambush (Josh 8:15-22 y), or to draw the enemy to a spot where the attacking army enjoyed a superior position (Judg 4:14-16 z; 5:19-21 aa).
Summary for 1Kgs 20:20-22: 20:20-22 ab Horses and chariots were a key asset in ancient warfare. Ahab’s destruction of the major portion of Ben-hadad’s striking power was essential to guard against a future incursion. Still, God’s prophet warned that the king of Aram would return.
• next spring: Late spring and early summer were standard seasons for warfare in the ancient Near East; the forces could count on good weather and a supply of grain from the early harvest.
20:23 ac The reasoning that Israel had gods of the hills set the stage for the Lord to show his true identity (20:28 ad). Ben-hadad’s officers had a pagan religious outlook. Perhaps their erroneous view was fostered by traditional knowledge of the Lord’s appearance to Israel on Mount Sinai (Exod 19:1-3 ae, 16-18 af) or of Israel’s long-term settlement of the hill country of Canaan (see Josh 10:40 ag; 11:16 ah; Judg 1:19 ai). The Arameans were not aware that God is the Creator and Lord of all the earth (Isa 40:28 aj; 54:5 ak), the only God who alone can save (Isa 45:5 al, 22 am).
Summary for 1Kgs 20:24-25: 20:24-25 an Ben-hadad’s field commanders reasoned that with trained military leadership and superiority in manpower and equipment, they would easily defeat Israel on the plains in the next encounter.
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